Science in Metaphysics

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 5Against Dispositional Monism.............................................................................................. 111.1 Preliminaries: Two Distinct Issues ....................................................................................111.2 The Truthmaking Criterion for the Dispositional/Categorical Distinction ...................121.3 Arguing Against Dispositional Monism From the Actual Existence of FundamentalCategorical Features ........................................................................................................................171.3.1 Spatiotemporal Relations as fundamental categorical features .............................181.3.1.1 Introduction............................................................................................................181.3.1.2 Spatiotemporal Relations and Subjunctive Conditionals in pre-GR theories ..211.3.1.3 Bird's Argument for the Dispositional Essence of Spatiotemporal Relations ..221.3.1.4 An Appraisal of the Argument .............................................................................241.3.1.5 A Nomic interpretation of Bird's counterfactual?..............................................31Against Identity Theory and Neutral Monism.................................................................... 352.1 Identity Theory....................................................................................................................352.1.1 Problems for Identity Theory....................................................................................352.1.1.1 The objection from the independent variability of dispositionality with respectto categoricality and vice versa. ..............................................................................................352.1.1.2 The one categoricality-multiple dispositionalities problem................................372.1.1.3 How can we understand (and justify) the 'surprising' triple identity?.............382.1.2 A Unique Categoricality? ..........................................................................................432.2 Neutral Monism ..................................................................................................................452.2.1 Neutral Monism and the Modified Ungrounded Argument...................................452.2.2 Agnosticism.................................................................................................................51In Defence of Categorical Monism....................................................................................... 533.1 In defence of the categoricality of fundamental properties: the argument fromrenormalisation ................................................................................................................................533.2 Objections ............................................................................................................................58Categorical Monism and Quidditism................................................................................... 634.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................634.2 Versions of RNDV...............................................................................................................6524.3 Defending RNDV ................................................................................................................724.3.1 The Permutation Difficulty........................................................................................724.3.2 Step 1: Rejecting the Transworld Existence of Fundamental Natural Properties744.3.3 Step 2: Adopting the Counterpart Framework .......................................................774.3.4 Two Versions of Property-Counterpart Theory Consistent with RNDV..............824.3.4.1 PCT1 (First Version of an RNDV-Friendly Property-Counterpart Theory) ...824.3.4.2 PCT2 (Second Version of an RNDV-Friendly Property-Counterpart Theory). 844.4 RNDV as the unique way of the de re modal representation of fundamental properties ............................................................................................................88Further Objections to Categorical Monism........................................................................ 905.1 The Argument from the truthmakers of unmanifested dispositions. .............................905.2 The Argument from science: scientific practice. ..............................................................975.3 The Argument from science: the scientific characterisation of fundamental properties. ...........................................................................................................1015.4 In no categorical terms? ...................................................................................................103The Contingent Character of Categoricality and Dispositionality ................................. 1096.1 The Metaphysical Contingency of Categorical Monism................................................1096.2 Challenging Orthodoxy ....................................................................................................1146.3 Objections ..........................................................................................................................1166.4 The modified criterion of dispositionality/categoricality...............................................121Do Nomic Relations Exist? ................................................................................................. 1277.1 On the ontological status of nomic relations...................................................................1287.2 Against DEAL: the case of symmetries and conservation laws ....................................1357.3 Against DEAL: the 'constant' threat ..............................................................................1397.3.1 Introduction. .............................................................................................................1397.3.2 Objections to the rescue?.........................................................................................1417.3.2.1 Objection to Premise (1)......................................................................................1417.3.2.2 Objection to Premise (2)......................................................................................1457.3.2.3 Objection to Premise (3)......................................................................................152Metaphysical Features of Nomic Relations and Laws ..................................................... 1628.1 The Modal Status of Laws of Nature...............................................................................162 38.1.1 Categorical Monistic Approaches ...........................................................................1628.1.2 Dispositional Monistic Approaches.........................................................................1658.1.3 An Argument for the Metaphysical Contingency of Laws ...................................1678.2 Hybrid Nomic Relations ...................................................................................................1718.3 The role of hybrid nomic relations in a M-world...........................................................177Concluding remarks............................................................................................................ 182References ............................................................................................................................ 185Index ..................................................................................................................................... 193... 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